If politicians care almost exclusively about the concerns of
the rich, it makes sense that over the past decades they've enacted policies
that have ended up benefiting the rich.
May 27, 2011 |

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The following article first appeared in http://motherjones.com/ - - free email updates here.
In 2008, a liberal Democrat was elected president. Landslide votes gave
Democrats huge congressional majorities. Eight years of war and scandal and
George W. Bush had stigmatized the Republican Party almost beyond redemption. A
global financial crisis had discredited the disciples of free-market
fundamentalism, and Americans were ready for serious change.
Or so it seemed. But two years later, Wall Street is back to http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/how-you-finance-goldman-sachs%E2%80%99-profits - - conservatives are triumphant . To understand why this happened,
it's not enough to examine polls and tea parties and the http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/henhouse-meet-fox-wall-street-washington-obama - - grown dramatically since the mid-'70s—far more http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/09/great-income-shift - - Larry Bartels studied the voting behavior of US senators in
the early '90s and discovered that they respond far more to the desires of
high-income groups than to anyone else. By itself, that's not a surprise. He
also found that Republicans don't respond at all to the desires of
voters with modest incomes. Maybe that's not a surprise, either. But this should
be: Bartels found that Democratic senators don't respond to the desires
of these voters, either. At all.
It doesn't take a multivariate correlation to conclude that these two things
are tightly related: If politicians care almost exclusively about the concerns
of the rich, it makes sense that over the past decades they've enacted policies
that have ended up benefiting the rich. And if you're not rich yourself, this is
a problem. First and foremost, it's an economic problem because it's
siphoned vast sums of money from the pockets of most Americans into those of the
ultrawealthy. At the same time, relentless concentration of wealth and power
among the rich is deeply corrosive in a democracy, and this makes it a
profoundly political problem as well.
How did we get here? In the past, after all, liberal politicians did make it
their business to advocate for the working and middle classes, and they worked
that advocacy through the Democratic Party. But they largely stopped doing this
in the '70s, leaving the interests of corporations and the wealthy nearly
unopposed. The story of how this happened is the key to understanding why the
Obama era lasted less than two years.
About a year ago, the http://www.journalism.org/analysis_report/who_drove_economic_news_and_who_didn%E2%80%99t#fn1 -
It wasn't always this way. Union leaders like http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_L._Lewis - - George Meany , and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Reuther - even those who did not belong to a union
themselves." (Emphasis mine.) Wages went up, even at nonunion companies.
Health benefits expanded, private pensions rose, and vacations became more
common. It was unions that made the American economy work for the middle class,
and it was their later decline that turned the economy upside-down and made it
into a playground for the business and financial classes.
Technically, American labor began its ebb in the early '50s. But as late as
1970, private-sector union density was still http://workinglife.org/wiki/Union+Membership:+Private+Sector+%281948-2004%29 - - New Left in the
'60s that these problems began to metastasize.
The problems were political, not economic. Organized labor requires
government support to thrive—things like the right to organize workplaces, rules
that prevent retaliation against union leaders, and requirements that management
negotiate in good faith—and in America, that support traditionally came from the
Democratic Party. The relationship was symbiotic: Unions provided money and
ground game campaign organization, and in return Democrats supported economic
policies like minimum-wage laws and expanded health care that helped not just
union members per se—since they'd already won good wages and benefits at the
bargaining table—but the interests of the working and middle classes writ
large.
But despite its roots in organized labor, the New Left wasn't much interested
in all this. As the http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/huron.html -
By the end of the '60s, the feeling was entirely mutual. New Left activists
derided union bosses as just another tired bunch of white, establishment Cold
War fossils, and as a result, the rupture of the Democratic Party that started
in Chicago in 1968 became irrevocable in Miami Beach four years later. Labor
leaders assumed that the hippies, who had been no match for either Richard
Daley's cops or establishment control of the nominating rules, posed no real
threat to their continued dominance of the party machinery. But precisely
because it seemed impossible that this motley collection of shaggy kids, newly
assertive women, and goo-goo academics could ever figure out how to wield real
political power, the bosses simply weren't ready when it turned out they had
miscalculated badly. Thus George Meany's surprise when he got his first look at
the New York delegation at the 1972 Democratic convention. "What kind of
delegation is this?" he sneered. "They've got six open fags and only three
AFL-CIO people on that delegation!"
But that was just the start. New rules put in place in 1968 led by almost
geometric progression to the nomination of George McGovern in 1972, and despite
McGovern's sterling pro-labor credentials, the AFL-CIO refused to endorse him.
Not only were labor bosses enraged that the hippies had thwarted the nomination
of labor favorite Hubert Humphrey, but amnesty, acid, and abortion were simply
too much for them. Besides, Richard Nixon had been sweet-talking them for four
years, and though relations had recently become strained, he seemed not entirely
unsympathetic to the labor cause. How bad could it be if he won reelection?
Plenty bad, it turned out—though not because of anything Nixon himself did.
The real harm was the eventual disaffection of the Democratic Party from the
labor cause. Two years after the debacle in Miami, Nixon was gone and Democrats
won a landslide victory in the 1974 midterm election. But the newly minted
members of Congress, among them former McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart,
weren't especially loyal to big labor. They'd seen how labor had treated
McGovern, despite his lifetime of support for their issues.
The results were catastrophic. Business groups, simultaneously alarmed at the
expansion of federal regulations during the '60s and newly emboldened by the
obvious fault lines on the left, started hiring lobbyists and launching
political action committees at a torrid pace. At the same time, corporations
began to realize that lobbying individually for their own parochial interests
(steel, sugar, finance, etc.) wasn't enough: They needed to band together to
push aggressively for a broadly pro-business legislative environment. In 1971,
future Supreme Court justice Lewis Powell wrote his http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=9606 - http://motherjones.com/category/primary-tags/us-chamber-commerce - - Business
Roundtable .
They didn't have to wait long for their first big success. By 1978, a
chastened union movement had already given up on big-ticket legislation to make
it easier to organize workplaces. But they still had every reason to think they
could at least win passage of a modest package to bolster existing labor law and
increase penalties for flouting rulings of the National Labor Relations Board.
After all, a Democrat was president, and Democrats held 61 seats in the Senate.
So they threw their support behind a compromise bill they thought the business
community would accept with only a pro forma fight.
Instead, the Business Roundtable, the http://motherjones.com/category/primary-tags/us-chamber-commerce -
Organized labor, already in trouble thanks to stagflation, globalization, and
the decay of manufacturing, now went into a death spiral. That decline led to a
decline in the power of the Democratic Party, which in turn led to fewer
protections for unions. Rinse and repeat. By the time both sides realized what
had happened, it was too late—union density had slumped below the point of no
return.
Why does this matter? Big unions have plenty of pathologies of their own,
after all, so maybe it's just as well that we're rid of them. Maybe. But in the
real world, political parties need an institutional base. Parties need money.
And parties need organizational muscle. The Republican Party gets the former
from corporate sponsors and the latter from highly organized church-based
groups. The Democratic Party, conversely, relied heavily on organized labor for
both in the postwar era. So as unions increasingly withered beginning in the
'70s, the Democratic Party turned to the only other source of money and
influence available in large-enough quantities to replace big labor: the
business community. The http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969741,00.html - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reagan_Democrat -
In other words, it's not that the working class has abandoned Democrats. It's
just the opposite: The Democratic Party has largely abandoned the working
class.
Here's why this is a big deal. Progressive change in the United States has
always come in short, intense spurts: The Progressive Era lasted barely a decade
at the national level, the New Deal saw virtually all of its legislative
activity enacted within the space of six years between 1933 and 1938, and the
frenzy of federal action associated with the '60s nearly all unfolded between
1964 and 1970. There have been exceptions, of course: The FDA was created in
1906, the GI Bill was passed in 1944, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
was passed in 1990. And the courts have followed a schedule all their own.
Still, one striking fact remains: Liberal reform is not a continuous movement
powered by mere enthusiasm. Reform eras last only a short time and require
extraordinarily intense levels of cultural and political energy to get started.
And they require two other things to get started: a Democratic president and a
Democratic Congress.
In 2008, fully four decades after our last burst of liberal change, we got
that again. But instead of five or six tumultuous years, the surge of liberalism
that started in 2008 lasted scarcely 18 months and produced only two legislative
changes really worthy of note: http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/07/chart-day-healthcare-reform - - Don't Ask, Don't Tell . By the summer of 2010 liberals were
dispirited, political energy had been co-opted almost entirely by the tea party
movement, and in November, Republicans won a crushing victory.
Why? The answer, I think, is that there simply wasn't an institutional base
big enough to insist on the kinds of political choices that would have kept the
momentum of 2008 alive. In the past, blue-collar workers largely took their cues
on economic policy from meetings in union halls, and in turn, labor leaders gave
them a voice in Washington.
This matters, as Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue in one of last year's http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/09/paul-pierson-jacob-s-hacker - - Winner-Take-All Politics , because politicians don't
respond to the concerns of voters, they respond to the organized muscle of
institutions that represent them. With labor in decline, both parties now
respond strongly to the interests of the rich—whose institutional representation
is deep and energetic—and barely at all to the interests of the working and
middle classes.
This has produced three decades of commercial and financial deregulation that
started during the administration of a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, gained steam
throughout the Reagan era, and continued under Bill Clinton. There were a lot of
ways America could have responded to the twin challenges of '70s-era stagflation
and the globalization of finance, but the policies we chose almost invariably
ignored the stagnating wages of the middle class and instead catered to the
desires of the superrich: hefty http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=213 - - Deregulation of S&Ls (PDF) that led to extensive looting
and billions in taxpayer losses. Monetary policy focused http://www.truth-out.org/article/dean-baker-alan-greenspan-the-boy-bubble - - financial crisis of 2008. At nearly every turn, corporations
and the financial industry used their institutional muscle to get what they
wanted, while the working class sat by and watched, mostly unaware that any of
this was even happening.
It's impossible to wind back the clock and see what would have happened if
things had been different, but we can take a pretty good guess. Organized labor,
for all its faults, acted as an effective countervailing power for decades,
representing not just its own interests, but the interests of virtually the
entire wage-earning class against the investor class. As veteran Washington
Post reporter http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6959-2004Sep8.html -
And that means things would have been different during the first two years of
the Obama era, too. Aside from the question of whether the crisis would have
been so acute in the first place, a labor-oriented Democratic Party almost
certainly would have demanded a bigger stimulus in 2009. It would have fought
hard for http://motherjones.com/mojo/2009/08/cramdown-resurrected - to help distressed homeowners, instead
of caving in to the banks that wanted it killed. It would have resisted the
reappointment of Ben Bernanke as Fed chairman. These and other choices would
have helped the economic recovery and produced a surge of electoral energy far
beyond Obama's first few months. And since elections are won and lost on
economic performance, voter turnout, and legislative accomplishments, Democrats
probably would have lost something like 10 or 20 seats last November, not 63.
Instead of petering out after 18 months, the Obama era might still have several
years to run.
This is, of course, pie in the sky. Organized labor has become a
shell of its former self, and the working class doesn't have any
institutional muscle in Washington. As a result, the Democratic Party no longer
has much real connection to moderate-income voters. And that's hurt nearly
everyone.
If unions had remained strong and Democrats had continued to vigorously press
for more equitable economic policies, middle-class wages over the past three
decades likely would have grown at about the same rate as the overall
economy—just as they had in the postwar era. But they didn't, and that meant
that every year, the money that would have gone to middle-class wage increases
instead went somewhere else. This created a vast and steadily growing pool of
money, and the chart below gives you an idea of its size. It shows how much
money would have flowed to different groups if their incomes had grown at the
same rate as the overall economy. The entire bottom 80 percent now
loses a collective http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/09/great-income-shift - - housing and http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_college_pricing_06.pdf - - The Great Risk Shift , which examined the ways in
which financial risk has increasingly been moved from corporations and the
government onto individuals. Income volatility, for example, has risen
dramatically over the past 30 years. The odds of experiencing a 50 percent drop
in family income have more than doubled since 1970, and this volatility has
increased for both high school and college grads. At the same time, traditional
pensions have almost completely disappeared, replaced by chronically underfunded
401(k) plans in which workers bear all the risk of stock market gains and
losses. Home http://fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/98-2.pdf - - bankruptcies have soared (PDF). These developments have been
disastrous for workers at all income levels.
This didn't all happen thanks to a sinister 30-year plan hatched in a
smoke-filled room, and it can't be reined in merely by exposing it to the light.
It's a story about power. It's about the loss of a countervailing power robust
enough to stand up to the influence of business interests and the rich on equal
terms. With that gone, the response to every new crisis and every new change in
the economic landscape has inevitably pointed in the same direction. And after
three decades, the cumulative effect of all those individual responses is an
economy focused almost exclusively on the demands of business and finance. In
theory, that's supposed to produce rapid economic growth that serves us all, and
30 years of free-market evangelism have convinced nearly everyone—even
middle-class voters who keep getting the short end of the economic stick—that
the policy preferences of the business community are good for everyone. But in
practice, the benefits have gone almost entirely to the very wealthy.
It's not clear how this will get turned around. Unions, for better or worse,
are history. Even union leaders don't believe they'll ever regain the power of
their glory days. If private-sector union density increased from 7 percent to 10
percent, that would be considered a huge victory. But it wouldn't be anywhere
near enough to restore the power of the working and middle classes.
And yet: The heart and soul of liberalism is economic egalitarianism. Without
it, Wall Street will continue to extract ever vaster sums from the American
economy, the middle class will continue to stagnate, and the left will continue
to lack the powerful political and cultural energy necessary for a sustained
period of liberal reform. For this to change, America needs a countervailing
power as big, crude, and uncompromising as organized labor used to be.
But what?
Over the past 40 years, the American left has built an enormous institutional
infrastructure dedicated to mobilizing money, votes, and public opinion on
social issues, and this has paid off with huge strides in civil rights,
feminism, gay rights, environmental policy, and more. But the past two years
have demonstrated that that isn't enough. If the left ever wants to regain the
vigor that powered earlier eras of liberal reform, it needs to rebuild the
infrastructure of economic populism that we've ignored for too long. Figuring
out how to do that is the central task of the new decade.
Kevin Drum is a political blogger for Mother
Jones. For more of his stories, click http://www.motherjones.com/authors/kevin-drum - - RSS
feed .